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Abstract 
We analyze a model of direct legislation to identify conditions under which competi­
tion in the provision of campaign information can affect the responsiveness of electoral 
outcomes to the preferences that a voter (or set of voters) would express if she (they) 
knew everything there was to know about the consequences associated with her elec­
toral alternatives. The basic intuition underlying the model is that a voter's ability use 
campaign information to form accurate inferences about the consequences of compet­
ing electoral alternatives can be affected by information provider attributes. We show 
that competition in the provision of campaign information increases the responsiveness 
of electoral outcomes only if competition produces these attributes. 
Competitive Campaigns and the Responsiveness of 
Collective Choice 
Elisabeth R. Gerber Arthur Lupia 
Introduction 
Voters in modern democracies are called upon to make very difficult choices between 
often ambiguous alternatives. This difficulty is particularly apparent in the case of direct 
legislation (initiative and referendum) elections, where voters are asked to make a choice 
from a small set of specific electoral alternatives. The task that direct legislation voters 
face is complicated by the absence of party endorsements and the often technical nature 
of, and lack of previous experience with, the electoral alternatives. An important question 
in the substantive interpretation of electoral outcomes is whether or not a voter can be 
expected to cast an "informed vote" when the alternatives from which she chooses are 
complex? In this research, we define an "informed vote" as the vote that a voter would 
cast if she knew everything there was to know about the consequences associated with 
the electoral alternatives from which she could choose. Using this definition, we identify 
conditions under which a voter can cast an "informed vote" without making a large 
investment in the acquisition of relevant information. 
The goal of our research is to determine whether or not certain general types of 
electoral competition can affect either a voter's knowledge of the content of electoral 
alternatives, the responsiveness of electoral outcomes, neither or both. In pursuit of 
this goal, we analyze a spatial model of direct legislation. We first use the model to 
identify the conditions under which competition in the provision of campaign information 
affects the likelihood that voters cast "informed votes." We then identify the conditions 
under which the same competition narrows the gap between aggregate direct l�gislation 
electoral outcomes and the preferences that a voter (or a s�t of voters) would express
if she (they) knew everything there was to know about the relevant issues. We call 
this second relationship the responsiveness of direct legislation. If the spatial distance
between a voter's (a set of voters) "informed" preference and the electoral outcome is 
large, we say that direct legislation is unresponsive to her (their) preferences. As the 
gap narrows, we say that the responsiveness of direct legislation to a voter's (the voters') 
preferences increases. 
Our interest in the effect of competition arises from a seeming contradiction in the 
literature. On the one hand, basic microeconomic theory can be interpreted to imply that 
greater competition among political adversaries should generate electoral outcomes that 
are more responsive to the preferences of a relevant majority of voters. In an example of 
research that attempts to identify the effect of competition in the provision of information 
on the actions of incompletely informed decision makers, Milgrom and Roberts ( 1986) find 
that the existence of competing, adversarial information providers allows an uncertain 
decision maker to successfully replicate the decision he would have made if he were 
completely informed. On the other hand, however, empirical evidence suggests that an 
increase in the number of direct legislation campaigners (from one campaigner running a 
non-competitive campaign to two campaigners running a competitive campaign), leads 
to confusion among already uncertain voters.1 Our research is designed to untangle this 
contradiction. 
The model we examine features political elites, who are uncertain about what their 
electoral opponents or the electorate will do, and an electorate that is uncertain about 
the relationship between the two available electoral alternatives and their own well being. 
Two political elites, who disagree about which electoral outcome would be "best," decide 
whether or not to expend resources in an attempt to affect the electoral outcome (conduct 
a campaign). Voters observe any campaigning that takes place and then choose an elec­
toral winner. The basic intuition that forms the foundation of the model is that a voter's 
ability to form accurate inferences about the consequences of competing electoral alter­
natives can be affected by information provider attributes. These attributes include the 
information provider's ability to take observable, costly effort and her credibility. When 
competition produces these attributes, we show that increasing the level of competition 
in the provision of information (from one active political elite/information provider to 
two adversarial political elites/information providers) increases the likelihood that voters 
cast "informed votes." It follows that when competition improves voter inferences, voters 
are more likely to cast "informed votes" and the actual aggregate electoral outcomes are 
more likely to be responsive. In contrast, if competition does not affect voters' ability to 
make informed decisions, then an increase in competition will not lead to an increase in 
direct legislation's responsiveness. 
Our intent is to make the exposition of this paper accessible to a diverse audience 
while basing our findings on formal analysis. With this approach in mind, we proceed 
as follows. In section 2, we provide some necessary background on direct legislation. 
We describe the fundamental dynamics of the direct legislation process and motivate the 
development of our model. The model and the insight we glean from it are described in 
section 3. ln'section 4,'we conclude; Appendix kicontains theTompleteformal structure 
of the spatial model and necessary proofs. Specialists in spatial modeling are directed to 
the appendix for technical details. 
1These accounts include Lowenstein 1982, Buck 1987, Price 1988 and Salzman 1988. 
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1 Defining Direct Legislation. 
Direct legislation is widely used but not widely understood. Therefore, we begin with 
a brief definition. Direct legislation allows voters to make choices from a small set of 
specific resolutions to collective choice problems. The two most commonly used types of 
direct legislation are the direct initiative and the referendum. Where the direct initiative 
is allowed, citizens can propose a specific change to an existing law. These citizens 
are generally required to collect at least a constitutionally-mandated number of valid 
voter signatures in order to convert their proposed change into a ballot measure for an 
upcoming election. On the day of the election, voters are asked to vote "yes" or "no" 
on the ballot measure. If the proportion of "yes" votes is at or above a constitutionally­
mandated level of support, the ballot measure becomes law, pending the approval of 
the courts. If the proportion of "yes" votes is below this level or an authorized court 
declares a winning ballot measure to be unconstitutional, the existing law (the status 
quo) prevails. The primary difference between the referendum and direct initiative is 
that the specific change to the law is proposed by a legislative body. Jurisdictions that 
use the referendum differ as to whether legislative approval, voter approval (in the form 
of signatures) or both is required to convert a legislative proposal into a ballot measure 
for an upcoming election. 2 
Direct legislation is widely used. 3 Wide usage provides the opportunity for many case 
studies as well as for experiments testing the effects of institutional design, culture, and in 
our case the effects of competition in the provision of information on the responsiveness 
of direct legislation. We examine one specific and frequently observed type of direct 
legislation election where voters are asked to choose between a single ballot measure and 
the status quo in order to resolve a collective disagreement. 4 Since it is often the case 
that one group takes the lead in running a campaign for a ballot measure, if there is a 
such a campaign, and another group takes the lead in running a campaign against the 
ballot measure, if there is one, we do not sacrifice much generality by treating direct 
legislation campaigns as though there are at most two campaigners, one on each side of 
the electoral debate, each a unitary actor. We refer to the group who qualifies a ballot 
measure and runs a campaign for it as the proposer and the group who runs a campaign
against a ballot measure as the opponent. 5 
We believe that studies of direct legislation can provide us with useful insights for 
2 A more comprehensive description of direct legislation rules and procedures can be found in Magleby 
1984. 
3 A review of the international use of direct legislation can be found in Butler and Ranney 1978. 
4This assumption does ·not preclude our-examination of·ballot·measures·on ballots·where there is 
more than one measure, however, it does preclude our examination of a ballot measure when there is at 
least one other ballot measure on the same ballot that deals with the same policy disagreement. While 
the strategic possibilities in multiple referendum cases are interesting, they are outside the scope of this 
paper. See Dubin, Kiewiet and Noussair 1992 for an empirical analysis of voting on competing ballot 
measures. 
50ur treatment also precludes a discussion of the case where it is widely known that a certain policy 
disagreement will be settled by a series of ballot measures that will appear on a series of ballots over a 
certain period of time. Theoretical and empirical research on this topic is reviewed in Rosenthal 1990. 
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understanding a broader class of collective choice processes. One reason for this belief 
is that direct legislation voters reveal preferences over specific pairs of potential poli­
cies. This is unlike voters in candidate-centered elections who vote for candidates whose 
precise effects on the resolution of any particular issue are obscured by the complex 
structure of legislative decision making. This difference in the context of the voter's 
decision means that, all else constant (including information), there should be a rela­
tively close correspondence between a voter's issue preferences and her voting behavior 
in direct legislation elections. A second reason for our belief about the utility of study­
ing direct legislation is the relationship between direct legislation voting behavior and 
voting behavior in legislatures. While both legislators and direct legislation voters have 
opportunities to choose from among a set of specific policy alternatives, direct legislation 
voters can cast their vote in private. To be sure, the direct legislation voter's privacy 
makes measuring individual-level voting relatively difficult, however, when these votes 
can be measured they are free of many of the strategic qualities of legislative votes that 
often make it impossible to infer a legislator's issue preferences from her voting behavior. 
Finally, unlike candidate-centered elections or legislative votes, political parties are often 
not a primary source of campaign information in direct legislation elections. The absence 
of parties, and the variance in the characteristics of the groups that provide information 
in direct legislation campaigns (many form only to support or oppose a single ballot 
measure), provides us with a greater opportunity to identify the general characteristics 
of political campaigns that affect voter beliefs and electoral outcomes. 
2 A Spatial Model of Direct Legislation. 
Direct legislation is modeled as a one-shot game between a proposer, an opponent and n 
voters. The object of the game is to select one of two policies, called the status quo and
the ballot measure, that determines a payoff for all players. Each policy is represented
as a point on the interval [O, l]. Without a loss of generality, we describe the case where 
players choose pure strategies. 
2.1 The players. 
Players have three relevant characteristics: their preferences, their information and the 
amount it costs them to take certain actions. Each player's preferences over outcomes 
can be described by an ideal point and a utility function. A player's ideal point is the 
point in [O, 1] that, if chosen, provides her with a higher payoff than any other point. We 
describe the case where each player has a linear, single-peaked utility function, which 
means that no player strictly prefers an outcome that is relatively far from her own 
ideal point to an outcome that is relatively close. It follows that every player prefers 
the electoral outcome, either the status quo or the ballot measure, that is the minimum 
distance from her ideal point. 
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We describe player information by simply saying that unless stated otherwise, all 
aspects of the game are common knowledge. We now state otherwise. Every player is 
uncertain about an important aspect of the game. The primary source of each player's 
uncertainty is a lack of information about other players' preferences.6 In general, we 
assume that each player knows the spatial location of her own ideal point, but is un­
certain about the spatial location of any other player's ideal point. To represent this 
uncertainty, we assume that the proposer's and all voters' ideal points are drawn from 
distinct, common knowledge probability distributions over points in [O, 1]. So, for exam­
ple, the proposer is the only player who knows the actual location of her ideal point. The 
opponent and the voters do not know the location of the proposer's ideal point, but they 
do have beliefs about its location. These beliefs are represented as the distribution from 
which the proponent's ideal point was drawn. The one exception to this assumption is 
that it is common knowledge that the opponent's ideal point is the status quo. Since a 
campaign against the ballot measure is equivalent, in this model, to a campaign for the 
status quo, this exception allows us to simplify the mathematical statement of the model 
and does not result in a significant loss of substantive generality. 
The third important player attribute is the cost associated with taking certain ac­
tions. We examine the case where proposing a ballot measure and/ or waging a campaign 
are costly activities, while voting is not. 7 The substantive motivation for introducing 
costs on campaigners is our observation of the money and effort that proposers and op­
ponents expend when they attempt to affect the outcome of direct legislation elections. 
These include costs associated with collecting the required signatures (for initiatives) or 
forming a legislative coalition (for referendums) and waging a campaign. Our simplifying 
interpretation of player costs is that a cost is the amount that the proponent or opponent 
expects they must spend to qualify a ballot measure and/or run a "winning" campaign. 
Therefore, we assume that players do not choose the magnitude of their costs - a player's 
only decision is whether or not to pay the costs she faces. Unless stated otherwise, we 
assume that the magnitudes of player costs are common knowledge. 
We now state otherwise. To introduce proposer uncertainty about the opponent in 
a substantively justifiable way, we assume that at the time she chooses her strategy 
the proposer is uncertain about the magnitude of the opponent's costs. To represent 
this uncertainty, we assume that the magnitude of the opponent's costs are drawn from a 
common knowledge probability distribution over points in [O, 1]. Since, in reality, a ballot 
measure proposer must initiate a direct legislation campaign (i.e. she must move before 
she can observe the magnitude of the opponent's costs), this assumption is substantively 
60ur model can be placed into the class of "setter models," of which Rom.er. and Rosenthal 1978 
is the best-known. Other spatial models of political decision making under conditions of uncertainty 
that provide insight into how incompletely informed decision voters make decisions include Austen­
Smith 1990, Banks 1990, Calvert 1985, Cameron and Jung 1992, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, Grofman 
and Norrander 1990, McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 and McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985. Ferejohn 
and Kuklinski 1990 provide a review of both spatial and psychological perspectives on the relationship 
between information and electoral behavior. 
7Whiie adding a cost ior voting might affect turnout, a discussion of voter turnout is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
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justifiable. 
2.2 The sequence of events. 
The sequence of events is depicted as an extensive form game in Figure 1. Table 1 
provides a summary of what each player knows at the time she chooses her strategy. Its 
relevance should become clearer as we describe the extensive form. 
[Figure 1 and Table 1 here.) 
The proposer moves first by choosing a strategy that has up to three components. 
The proposer's first strategic decision is whether or not to propose a ballot measure. To 
take this action, the proposer must first must commit to pay a "cost of challenging the 
status quo." If the proposer chooses not to pay this cost, the game ends and each player's 
payoff is based on the distance between the status quo and her own ideal point (the larger 
the distance, the lower the payoff). If the proposer chooses to pay this cost, the game 
continues. 
The magnitude of the "cost of challenging the status quo" depends on the opponent's 
future actions. We model the commitment to challenge the status quo as a contingent 
contract where the proposer agrees to pay one price if the opponent does not wage a 
campaign and another price if the opponent does decide to wage a campaign. Since the 
proposer is uncertain about the costs the opponent faces, she is uncertain about what 
actions the opponent will take and, hence, is uncertain about whether she will have to 
pay to wage a competitive or non-competitive campaign. Therefore, the amount she 
expects to pay is based on her beliefs about the opponent's costs. 
The second component of the proposer's strategy is to determine the content of the 
ballot measure. We model her choice of the ballot measure's content as the choice of 
a single point on [O, 1). We assume that the opponent knows the content of the ballot 
measure, while voters do not. Our motivation for allowing the opponent to have this 
type of information is that direct legislation campaigns are typically run by groups who 
understand a ballot measure well enough to organize an effort against it. Our motivation 
for assuming that voters do not know the content of the ballot measure is that ballot 
measures offered to voters in direct legislation are often complex. Therefore, we construct 
a simple representation of voter uncertainty by assuming that voters know the content 
of the status quo, but are uncertain about the content of the ballot measure (and, hence, 
about how the electoral outcome, will affect-their,own payoff) . The case where voters do 
understand the content of the ballot measure is a special case of our model. 8 
8This aspect of voter uncertainty is a direct result of voter uncertainty about the proposer's ideal 
point. Since the voters have consistent beliefs about the location of the proposer's ideal point, and 
since the proposer has no other private information at the time she chooses the ballot measure, voters 
can form consistent beliefs about the location of the ballot measure. The formation of these beliefs is 
described in Appendix A. 
6 
The third component of the proposer's strategy is to send a campaign message to 
voters about the content of the ballot measure. The proposer's campaign message is 
modeled as a simple left/right signal. The signal "left" is understood to mean that the 
proposer claims that the ballot measure is to the left of the status quo. The signal "right" 
is defined accordingly. We do not restrict the proposer to the transmission of a truthful 
campaign message. 
Though the proposer is restricted to signaling either "left" or "right," the intuition 
provided by examining this type of communication is quite general. Since each player 
knows the location of her ideal point, and, thus, knows whether he or she prefers points 
to the left or right of the status quo, the messages "left" and "right" are equivalent to 
more general signals like "the ballot measure is better for you than the status quo" and 
"the ballot measure is worse for you than the status quo." We observe that many direct 
legislation campaign advertisements contain simple messages that have these types of 
implications. 
When a ballot measure is proposed, the opponent then has to decide whether or not 
to wage a campaign against it. We assume that the opponent knows the content of 
the ballot measure, the proponent's costs (and how they are related to her own choice 
of strategy) and the content of the proposer's campaign message. The opponent's sole 
source of uncertainty is the location of voter ideal points (and, hence, how voter behavior 
will be affected by her campaign message). If the opponent wants to campaign against the 
ballot measure she must pay the exogenously determined cost of taking such an action. 
Paying this cost allows the opponent to send the electorate a left/right signal, which is 
defined in the same way as the proposer's campaign message. As was the case with the 
proposer, we do not restrict the opponent to the transmission of a truthful campaign 
message. 
The voters have the last move in this game. All voters know how much the proponent 
and the opponent paid to wage their campaigns for and against the ballot measure and 
observe all campaign messages. Voters are uncertain about the spatial location of the 
ballot measure and other voters' ideal points.9 Voters end the game by casting a vote for 
either the ballot measure or the status quo. Majority (or supermajority) rule determines 
whether the ballot measure or the status quo will be the outcome. 
2.3 Description of theoretical findings. 
We use the model to showthat·the effect of competitiorrirrthe provisionof information 
on the responsiveness of direct legislation depends on how campaign activity affects voter 
9The assumption that voters can observe campaign effort and messages is without loss of generality 
to a class of assumptions where voter perceptiveness on these matters is impaired. We also make the 
simplifying and substantively justifiable assumption that voters are not sophisticated enough to draw an 
inference about the content of the ballot measure when the opponent does not wage a campaign against 
the ballot measure. 
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beliefs about the content of the ballot measure. We begin by detailing the characteristics 
of campaign activity that affect voter beliefs. We then discuss how competition affects 
the responsiveness of direct legislation as a function of these characteristics. 
2.3.1 Costly effort and voter inferences. 
Let c• be the cost actually paid by a campaigner (this discussion applies to either the 
proposer or the opponent). Because the campaigner need not pay c* to attempt to affect 
the electoral outcome, the fact that she does so conveys information to voters. The 
information provided by this action is that the campaigner believes that she can recover 
(at least) her costs. That is, from the observation that the campaigner has waged a 
costly campaign, voters can infer that the ballot measure and the status quo must be far 
enough apart to justify her expenditure. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) depict the relationship 
between a voter's beliefs about the location of the ballot measure before and after she 
learns that a campaigner paid c• to wage a campaign. 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
In Figure 2(a), we present an example in which voters know that the status quo is 
located at . 7, but are initially uncertain about the content of the ballot measure, which 
is actually located at .2. (Other examples can be constructed using the model as it is 
presented in Appendix A.) Figure 2(b) depicts how voters' beliefs about the content of the 
ballot measure change as a result of observing campaign expenditure c• and knowing that 
the shape of the campaigner's utility function makes an expenditure of c* worthwhile only 
if it can produce a policy change of a distance greater than, say . 15. It follows that after 
observing campaign expenditure c•, voters can correctly infer that the spatial location of 
the ballot measure is not between .55 and .85 (otherwise the campaigner would keep c* 
and accept her least preferred electoral outcome). 
We argue that a voter's ability to observe costly campaign effort makes her better able 
to form an accurate inference about the content of the ballot measure. In our example, 
when voters observe costly effort, updated voter beliefs must assign a higher probability 
to all possible locations of the ballot measure that are not within the interval [.55, .85]. 
Since the true location of the ballot measure cannot be located in this interval, voters 
who observe costly campaign effort must assign a higher probability to the true location 
of the ballot measure than they did before they observed the expenditure. Therefore, 
we can say that the observation of costly effort allows voters to form more accurate 
inferences about the content of the ballot measure because a voter who is given a single 
opportunity to guess the exact location of the ballot measure (or which of a finite number 
of non-overlapping intervals the ballot measure lies within) before and after observing 
costly effort, is more likely to guess correctly after the observation. It follows that the 
larger the observable level of campaigner effort, the wider is the interval in which the 
voters know the ballot measure cannot lie and the more accurate are voter inferences, all 
else constant. In general, more accurate inferences make a voter more likely to cast an 
"informed vote." 
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The improvement in voter inferences due to the observation of costly campaign effort 
is independent of the content of campaign messages. Whether or not a voter can also 
use the content of a campaign message to learn about the content of the ballot measure 
depends on her beliefs about the campaigner's credibility. With respect to the issue of 
credibility, we recognize that in many collective choice situations, those who have the 
resources to provide information sometimes have an incentive to mislead those who re­
ceive it. To identify the effect of an information provider's credibility on voter inferences, 
we examine two extreme cases. In the first case, no voter is able to verify whether or 
not the content of a message is truthful (a minimally credible campaign message). In
the second case, the content of a message is known to be truthful (a perfectly credible 
campaign message) . We assume that all players know which circumstance prevails for
each campaigner. Comparing voter inferences in each case provides insight about the 
general effects of an information provider's credibility on voter inferences (a comprehen­
sive study of the effects of credibility on the behavior of a direct legislation proposer and 
incompletely informed voters is the subject of Lupia 1993). 
In the minimal credibility case, there exists no sanction for campaigners who send 
untruthful messages. This implies that the content of a minimally credible campaign 
message does not necessarily depend on the true directional relationship between the 
ballot measure and the status quo and that voters cannot use the message's content to 
form a more accurate inference about the content of the ballot measure.10 Figure 2( c) 
shows an example of voter beliefs about the location of the ballot measure before and 
after she receives a minimally credible campaign message. That figure shows that a 
voter's prior and updated beliefs about the location of the ballot measure are identical -
- implying that voters learn nothing from the content of a minimally credible campaign 
message. Figure 2( d) shows an example of the total effect of a "minimally credible 
campaign" on voter inferences. Since the voters learn nothing from the content of a 
minimally credible message, the change in voter beliefs is due solely to voter's observation 
of the associated costly campaign effort. 
We now consider the case where the campaign message is perfectly credible. Voters 
can infer that the ballot measure is not to the right of the status quo when they receive the 
perfectly credible message "the ballot measure is to the left of the status quo." While this 
type of message is not sufficient for voters to infer the exact location of the ballot measure, 
it does allow them to eliminate ranges in which the ballot measure cannot lie. Figures 3(a) 
and 3(b) shows an example of the relationship between a voter's beliefs about the location 
of the ballot measure before and after she receives the perfectly credible message "left." A 
comparison of Figure 3(b) with Figure 2( c) shows the effect of campaigner credibility on 
10Both Cameron and Jung 1992 and Lupia 1993 show conditions under which voters in direct 
legislation-type models can learn from "cheap talk" (a term due to Crawford and Sobel 1982). Cameron 
and Jung show that a voter can learn from cheap talk when they know that the campaigner shares their 
preferences over outcomes. Lupia shows that a voter can increase her expected utility from the act of 
voting when her prior beliefs about a campaigner's preferences suggest a relatively high probability that 
the campaigner shares her interests over outcomes. The minimally credible campaign message, from 
which such inferences are not possible by definition, is an extreme case of the interaction studied in both 
of these models. 
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voter inferences. When an campaign message is perfectly credible, voters can form more 
accurate inferences about the location of the ballot measure than when the campaign 
message is minimally credible. 
[Figure 3 about here. J 
Figure 3( c) shows the total effect of a perfectly credible campaign message on voter 
inferences. From the observation of costly effort, voters can conclude that the ballot 
measure is not very close to the status quo (as in Figure 2(b)). From the content of the 
perfectly credible message "left," voters can infer that the ballot measure is not to the 
right of the status quo (as in Figure 3(b)). In this case, voters who observe a perfectly 
credible campaign message are more likely than voters who observe either a minimally 
credible campaign message or no campaign message to be able to correctly guess the true 
content of the ballot measure. 
2.3.2 The effect of competition on responsiveness. 
Since a voter who can form an accurate inference about the content of the ballot measure 
is generally better able to discriminate between the electoral alternatives that make her 
better off and the alternatives that make her worse off, we argue that competition in­
creases responsiveness only if competition allows voters to form more accurate inferences 
about the ballot measure. This effect of competition on responsiveness manifests itself 
in four ways: 
1. the proposer's beliefs about the opponent's willingness and ability to wage an ef­
fective campaign against the ballot measure can affect her decision about whether
or not to propose a ballot measure;
2. these same beliefs can also affect the proposer's choice of ballot measure content;
3. when competition increases the observable effort of at least one of the campaigners,
a voter's ability to observe campaigner effort allows her to form a more accurate
inference about the content of the ballot measure;
4. when competition increases the credibility of at least one of the campaigners, a
voter can use the content of campaign message to form a more accurate inference
about the content of the ballot measure.
In the remainder of this section, we use the findings of our model to explain why compe­
tition has these effects and how these effects are related to the responsiveness of direct 
legislation. 
The first effect of competition is on the proposer's decision about whether or not to 
propose a ballot measure. The intuition here is straightforward: if the proposer either 
expects to, or knows that she will, face an opponent who is able to wage a campaign that 
10 
will lead a majority of voters to reject the ballot measure, then she may be better off not 
expending the effort necessary to qualify and support a ballot measure. This scenario is 
relatively likely when the proposer and a majority of voters prefer very different types of 
outcomes and the opponent is able, by means of her observable effort or the credibility of 
her campaign message, to convince voters of this difference. In contrast, if the proposer 
expects that her opposition will be ineffective, or that the opponent's costs are sufficiently 
high that she would not find it worthwhile to campaign against the ballot measure, then 
the proposer's decision to participate is not affected by competition. This scenario is 
relatively likely when either the opponent does not see enough difference between the 
ballot measure and the status quo to wage a campaign or the opponent is neither credible 
enough nor can exert the necessary amount of costly effort to affect voter behavior. 
It follows that when a proposer is dissuaded from proposing a ballot measure because 
of her expectations about the electoral effects of competition, then competition makes 
direct legislation more responsive to voters whose ideal points are relatively close to the 
status quo and is less responsive to voters whose preferences are like those of the proposer. 
In contrast, when the opponent is impotent, an increase in competition does not affect 
responsiveness.11 
The second effect of competition is on the content of the ballot measure. In the 
absence of competition in the provision of information, Lupia 1992 used a spatial election 
model with incompletely informed voters to show that when the proposer expects voters 
to have incomplete information about the ballot measure on election day, she considers 
only her own preferences when choosing the content of the ballot measure. (In fact, she 
always chooses the content of the ballot measure to correspond exactly to her ideal point.) 
In contrast to the case where the proposer knows that there will be no competition in the 
provision of information, we show that the specter of competition induces the proposer to 
consider the preferences of other players when choosing the content of the ballot measure. 
If the amount it costs the proposer to wage a competitive campaign is greater than the 
amount it costs her to wage a non-competitive campaign, or if the proposer believes that 
the opponent is able to wage a campaign that will lead to the electoral defeat of the 
ballot measure, then the proposer may have an incentive to choose the ballot measure's 
content so that it dissuades the opponent from waging a campaign. To support this 
insight, consider the following example: 
Suppose the proposer expects that if the opponent wages a campaign, 
her ballot measure will lose the election and if the opponent does not wage 
a campaign, her ballot measure will win the election .. Suppose further that 
the proponent expects that the amount it will cost the opponent to wage a 
11 It also follows that as the cost of challenging the status quo increases, then the status quo is less 
likely to be challenged. If an increase in competition increases the cost of challenging the status quo, 
then when voters would be better off with the status quo as the outcome, as opposed to the ballot 
measure, an increase in competition increases the responsiveness of direct legislation to the preferences 
of voter who prefer the status quo. This finding is docun1ented in experimental work by Herzberg and 
Wilson 1990. 
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campaign is one million dollars. The proposer may then have an incentive to 
choose the content of the ballot measure so that it is more like the status quo 
(the opponent's ideal point). The proposer has this incentive if: the opponent 
can affect the electoral outcome; moving the ballot measure closer to the 
status quo reduces the opponent 's expected benefit of waging the campaign 
so much that it is no longer greater than her costs; and moving the ballot 
measure still leaves the proposer better off than if she had not contested the 
election. 
While the presence of an opponent who can affect the electoral outcome forces the 
proposer to be more responsive to the preferences of the opponent, this does not nec­
essarily imply that direct legislation outcomes will be more responsive to any voter's 
preferences. The presence of an opponent can only influence the proposer to choose a 
ballot measure that is closer to the status quo than her own ideal point would have been, 
it does not necessarily influence the proposer to consider the preferences of any subset of 
the electorate when drafting her proposal. All else held constant, the responsiveness of 
direct legislation improves as a result of increased competition only if the a voter's pref­
erences are closer to the preferences of an opponent who can affect the electoral outcome 
than they are to the preferences of the proposer. 
The third and fourth effects of competition follow straightforwardly from our dis­
cussion of the relationship between campaign activity and voter inferences. When an 
increase in competition increases the costs of campaigning, voters who can observe costly 
effort can form more accurate inferences about the content of the ballot measure. In gen­
eral, the more accurate are voter inferences, the more likely voters are to cast the same 
votes they would have cast if they were well informed and the more responsive is direct 
legislation to those voter's preferences. In addition, if competition in the provision of 
information forces campaigners to be more credible (perhaps as a result of the enhanced 
ability of the electorate to detect an untruthful message), then, recalling that more cred­
ible messages allow voters to form more accurate inferences about the content of the 
ballot measure, an increase in competition leads to an increase in the responsiveness of 
direct legislation. 
3 Conclusion. 
We began with the question: "Can a voter be expected to cast an "informed vote" when 
the alternatives from which she choose are complex?" We offered the possibility that 
the level of competition in the provision of campaign information might affect voters' 
ability to cast informed votes, but pointed out that the nature of this relationship was 
unclear from previous research. Using a spatial model of direct legislation, we identified 
characteristics of campaign activity that affected both a voter's ability to comprehend 
the content of electoral alternati\Tes and the outcomes of direct legislation elections. 
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Voters who face complex issues can use their observations of certain types of campaign 
activity to increase the likelihood that they cast the same vote they would have cast if 
they knew everything there was to know about the electoral alternatives. When there 
exist information providers who exert costly and observable effort, our analysis suggests 
that voters can use their observation of this effort to form more accurate inferences 
about the magnitude of the difference between a ballot measure and the status quo. We 
also demonstrate that an information provider's credibility has a similar effect on voter 
inferences. It follows that when competition in the provision of information leads to 
improved voter inferences direct legislation is more responsive to the preferences voters 
would have expressed if they had gone out and acquired information about the ballot 
measure themselves. 
Competition in the provision of information also affects responsiveness through the 
strategic interaction of the competing electoral contestants. Specifically, when the pro­
poser of a ballot measure expects that those opposed to the ballot measure are credible 
enough or can exert sufficient observable and costly effort to affect the electoral outcome, 
she is compelled to consider the preferences of the opposition when choosing whether or 
not to challenge the status quo and when selecting the content of the ballot measure. 
Thus an increase in the level of competition in the provision of information (the intro­
duction of an electoral opponent) increases responsiveness only if the opponent has the 
characteristics that allow it to take actions that affect voter inferences enough to affect 
voting behavior and a voter's preferences are relatively close to those of the opposition. 
When the opponent lacks these characteristics, an increase in competition does not lead 
to an increase in responsiveness. 
Elsewhere (Gerber and Lupia 1992), we have attempted an empirical test of some 
of our findings. Using the premise that well-informed survey respondents were more 
likely than poorly-informed survey respondents to cast the same vote they would have 
cast if they knew everything there was to know about the relevant electoral alternatives, 
we provide empirical evidence of the conditional relationship between competition and 
responsiveness. Our analysis reveals a strong negative relationship between the amount 
of expenditure by the direct legislation campaigner and the difference between actual 
aggregate electoral outcomes and what we estimate these electorates would have chosen if 
they had been better informed. Using campaign expenditure as a surrogate for observable 
campaign effort and the absolute value of the difference between actual and estimated 
"informed" electoral outcomes as a surrogate for direct legislation responsiveness, our 
empirical analysis supports our theoretical findings about the conditional nature of the 
relationship between competition and responsiveness. 
Our theoretical and empirical efforts are part of an ongoing attempt to understand 
collective choice through an analysis of direct legislation. Our future research in this area 
involves the introduction of other types of competition into our analyses. One type of 
competition is the presence of multiple proponents. While intuition from microeconomic 
theory might lead us to believe that more competition in the provision of specific alter­
natives would lead to more responsive electoral outcomes, at least some activists believe 
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differently. Consider the statement: "The current way for special interests to stave off 
reforms proposed by citizens is not to debate the issues but to put on measures that 
will be smokescreens or diversion tactics."12 Another type of competition is that from a 
legislature. Specifically, how does the existence of direct legislation affect the decisions 
made by legislators. We will examine whether or not the threat of citizen sponsored 
remedies to collective choice problems induces legislators to be more or less responsive 
to voter preferences. 
The policy implications of our analysis are strrughtforward. More responsive electoral 
outcomes will not necessarily be produced by more competition in the provision of infor­
mation, such as is suggested in several reforms of elections that include public financing. 
Only if such reforms are accompanied by ways of either enhancing campaigner credibility 
through institutional design or providing more information about the preferences (iden­
tities) of proponents and opponents of measures, can greater competition lead to greater 
responsiveness. 
12Jim Wheaton, executive director of California Common Cause, "a 55,000 member, non-profit, non­
partisan public interest group." Reported in the California Journal, August 1990. 
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A Definition of the model. 
Direct legislation is modeled as a one shot, multi-stage game between n + 2 players. "n" 
of the players, (N = {l, . . .  , n }, where n is finite), are called "voters," one player is called 
the "proponent," and another is called the "opponent." The purpose of the game is to 
choose a single point from the finite policy continuum [O, 1], which will determine a payoff 
for all players. Unless otherwise stated, all parameters of the game are assumed to be 
common knowledge. Without a loss of generality, we assume that all players choose pure 
and undominated strategies. 
A.1 The players. 
Each player's preferences are represented by a single-peaked utility function. The pro­
ponent's, opponent's and voter i's ideal points are denoted PROP, SQ and VOT;, re­
spectively. We assume that PROP is the result of a single draw from the distribution 
7r and that VOT; is the result of a single draw from the distribution ,P;. 7r and 1/J; are 
common knowledge and have densities 7r, and .p;, respectively. We assume that 7r has
all of its support in the subset of [O, 1 J called PROP and that 1/J; has all of its support 
in the subset of [O, l] called VOT;. PROP and VOT; are private information. Notice 
that we do not assume that all voters to be drawn from a single distribution (for any 
two voters i and j, ,P; need not equal ,Pj)· Therefore, the proponent and opponent, who 
choose their strategies before the voters, can be truly uncertain about the election result. 
For notational simplicity, we denote the proponent's and opponent's beliefs about the 
electorates' preference profile as i[J. 
Proponent and opponent actions are assumed to be costly. The proponent's costs 
are denoted Cnocomp E [O, l] when there is not a competitive campaign and Ccomp E [O, l] 
when there is a competitive campaign. The opponent's costs are denoted Copp E lR+. We 
assume that these costs are determined exogenously and that once the costs are paid 
the magnitude of the payment is common knowledge. Therefore, we say that Copp is 
drawn from the cumulative distribution function /, which has density 1' and has all of 
its support over a subset of [O, l], which we call COST. I represents the proponent's 
prior beliefs about the opponent's costs and is the basis of the proponent's beliefs about 
what the opponent will do. Since the proponent moves first, no player is uncertain about 
the magnitude of Ccomp and Cnocomp· 
A.1.1 The sequence-of events. 
The proponent moves first and must choose a strategy that has up to three components. 
The proponent's first strategic decision is CH ALL E { 0, 1}. When CH ALL = 0 is 
chosen, the game ends and SQ is the outcome that determines a payoff for all players. 
When CH ALL = 1 is chosen, the proponent designs one ballot measure - denoted 
BM E [O, l], sends a campaign message and signs a costlessly enforceable contract, 
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the terms of which are common knowledge, to pay either Cnocomp or Ccomp depending on 
whether or not the opponent also decides to become an active participant in the game. 
At the time she chooses her strategy, the proponent knows the magnitude of Ccomp and 
Cnocomp, is uncertain about which cost she will pay, but does have beliefs / with which 
she can form an inference about the expected cost of contesting the election. It follows 
that when an election is held it is of the form: SQ versus BM. 
The third and final component of the proponent's strategy is to determine the con­
tent of a campaign message. The proponent's campaign strategy is denoted MSGpro E 
{-1,1}. MSGpro = -1 when the proponent sends the message: " BM is to the left of 
SQ". MSGpro = 1 when the proponent sends the message: "OFFER is to the right 
of SQ". The proponent is not necessarily restricted to the transmission of truthful in­
formation. (We do not denote the case BM = SQ, as this location strategy is weakly 
dominated when the proponent's costs equal zero and is strictly dominated when these 
costs are positive.) The particular strategy chosen by the proponent takes the form 
pro(PROP, ccomp , Cnocomp) = (CHALL, BM, MSGpro), where: 
pro: [0,1]3--> {0,1} x [0,1] x {-1,1}. 
If the proponent has chosen to make a proposal, the opponent then chooses her 
strategy. The opponent's strategic decision MSGopp E {-1,0,1} equals 1 when the 
opponent pays Copp and sends message " BM is to the left of SQ," -1 when the oppo­
nent pays Copp and sends message " BM is to the right of SQ,'' and 0 when the oppo­
nent chooses not to participate. The opponent is not restricted to the transmission of 
truthful information. The particular strategy chosen by the opponent takes the form 
opp( SQ, Copp, BM) = MSG opp' where:
opp: [0,1]3--> {-1,0,1}. 
Voters have the final move in the game. Voters have beliefs about, but do not know, 
the exact location of BM. Each voter's beliefs about the location of BM are represented 
by the cumulative distribution /](BM), which has corresponding density j3' (BM) and 
support over a known subset of [O, l]. 
Voters beliefs are consistent, in the sense of Kreps and Wilson 1982, and are derivable 
from voter prior beliefs about the location of the proponent's ideal point 7r(PROP). 
The proponent's only private information, at the time he chooses his strategy, is the 
location of his ideal point. Since voters know the probability that the proponent's ideal 
point is any .. particular. point p .E ... {0,1 ], .. .they .can use .these .beliefs and the. common 
knowledge to form consistent beliefs about the location of BM. For any x E [O, 1], 
/]' (BM = x) = fprob(BM = xlp)7r'(PROP)dPROP. Let BM be the subset of [0,1] 
over which j3 has all of its support. 
After voters observe the proponent's and opponent's effort and campaign message, 
they vote for either BM ( V D T  E; = i) or SQ (VDT E; = 0). The particular strategy cho­
sen by voter i takes the form vot;(VOT;, Ccomp, Cnocomp' MSGpro, Copp, MSG opp) = V D T  E;,
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where 
vot;: [0,1)4 x { -1,1} x { -1, 0,1} -> { 0,1}. 
Majority (or supermajority) rule determines the outcome of the election. (None of 
our results depend on the use of simple majority rule.) We assume that players choose 
pure strategies, which gives the outcome function a relatively simple form. For any 
pro E { l } x [0,1) x { -1, 0,1}, opp E { -1, 0,1} and vot; E { -1,1} 
n n n n out(pro, opp, vot1, • • •  , votn) = BM if: I; vot; > - and SQ if: I; vot; :=; - • 
� 2 � 2 
The outcome determines the payoffs to all players. We describe the case where SQ 
wins ties, indifferent voters vote for SQ and indifferent proponents and opponents choose 
not to take costly action. The electoral tie-breaking assumption is consistent with the 
tie-breaking rule used in many of direct legislation elections. To simplify notation, we 
denote out(pro, opp, vot1, • • •  , votn) as out(*). 
A.2 Player Objective Functions. 
Without a loss of generality to other quasi-concave (single-peaked) preference functions, 
we describe the case where each player has a symmetric, linear and single peaked utility 
function. Players attempt to maximize their ex post utility. A player's ex post utility is 
determined by the distance between their own ideal point and whichever of SQ and BM 
was chosen as the outcome and the costs of their own actions. Let c. E { Ccomp, Cnocomp} 
be the costs that the Proponent actually pays. The ex post utility for each player can be 
written as: 
proponent: -!PROP - out(*)I- (cnocomp X CHALL X (1 - IMSGopp l ) )  
opponent: 
voter i: 
- (ccomp x CHALL x IMSGopp l )  
- ISQ - out(*)I- (ccomp X J MSGoppl) 
- IVOT, - out(*)I 
Since players are uncertain about the value of their ex post utility at the time they 
choose their strategies, each attempts to maximize their ex post utility by maximizing 
their interim expected utility. As interim expected utility is based on a player's beliefs 
about the effect of their own actions as well as the actions of other players whose choices 
follow later in the .. g4me, .we. develop the notation for .each .. player'.s.jnterim utility by 
working backwards through the sequence of events. 
We start with the derivation of the interim utility of the voters. To simplify notation, 
let SIGpro = (c., MSGpro) be the vector of signals that is sent by the proponent to the 
voters. Let SIGopp = (copp, MSGopp) denote the vector of signals that is sent by the 
opponent to the voters. For any voter i and V (SlGpro, SIGopp) let:
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Yes;(j3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) - 1 if - j J BM - VOT; J  
xj3(BMJ SIGpro, SIGopp)d BM > - J SQ - VOT; J , 
Yes;(j3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) - 0 otherwise. 
No;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIG opp) = 1 - Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) · 
Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIG opp) is a binary variable that identifies whether a voter with 
ideal point VOT;, prior beliefs /3(BM) and campaign messages (SIGpro, SIGopp) would 
receive expected utility from BM that is greater than the utility from SQ. 
No;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIG0pp) is a binary variable that identifies whether a voter with 
ideal point VOT;, prior beliefs j3(BM) and campaign messages (SIGpro, SIG opp) would 
receive expected utility from BM that is less than or equal to the utility from SQ. 
(The set of voter types who would be indifferent is, theoretically, of measure zero, but is 
included for notational consistency.) We can now state voter i's interim expected utility 
as: 
�;( vot;JVOT;, /3(BMJ S1Gpro, SIG opp, Y es;(j3(BM), SIGpro' SIG0pp), IJi) = 
[f J BM - VOT; Jj3'(BMJSIGpro, SIGopp)d BM 
x (L:;eN ; fYes;(/3(BM), SIGpr0, SIG0pp)1/J;d VOT; + �)] __ 
[ ISQ - VOT;J x (L:;eN ; J No;(j3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp)i/J;d VOT; + 1-�01' )] 
We can now also state the opponent's interim expected utility as: 
�o(oppJSQ, SIGopp, j3(BMJSIGpro, SIG opp) ,  Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) ,  IJi) = 
[IBM - SQJ x (L:ieN J Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIG0vp)1/J;d VOT;)] 
[Copp X J MSGopp J] 
The proponent's maximization problem is similar to the opponent's. The proponent is 
uncertain about which strategies the electorate will choose, but has the same information 
(and beliefs) about voter behavior as the opponent's does (Yes; and IJi). In addition, the
proponent is uncertain about which strategy the opponent will choose. 
Let mopp(O J BM, Copp' Yes;(j3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) ,  IJi) equal 1 if an opponent who 
observes ballot measure BM, has costs Copp and beliefs about voter strategies Yes; and l]i 
would choose not to run a campaign. Let movv(O J BM, c0PP• Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) ,  
IJi) equal 0 otherwise. mopp(l J . )  = 1 and mopp(- l J .) = 1 are similarly defined for the
opponent's decision to send the campaign message MSGopp = 1 and MSGopp = -1, 
respectively. "Stated formally, m.;pp(OJ . )  = l if: 
�o(OJSQ, SIG opp, j3(BMJ SIGpro, SIGopp), Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp), IJi) �
max(�0(-l J SQ, SIG0PP• /3(BMJSIGpro, SIG opp), Yes;(/3(BM), SIGvro, SIG opp), IJi), 
�o( l J SQ, SIG opp, /3(BMJ SIGpro, SI Gapp), Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpro, SIG opp), IJi)) 
The proponent can infer the likely actions of the opponent's by integrating the mopp 
terms over the distribution that represents her beliefs about the opponent's costs. We 
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denote the proponent's beliefs about the probability that the opponent will choose not 
to campaign when he observes BM as µ0pp(O!BM, /, Yes;(f3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp) ,  Ill) 
µopp ( l l .) and µopp(-1 1 -) are similarly defined. For M SGopp = M E { -1, 0, 1 }, 
µ(M!BM, 1, Y es;(/3(BM), SIG pro, SIGopp), w) = 
f m0pp(M!BM, 1, Yes;(/3(BM), SIGpr0, SIGopp), w)l'd COST. 
The proponent's interim utility is expressed as: (square brackets are subscripted to 
ease readability) 
<I>p(pro!P ROP, Ccomp > Cnocomp, µopp(MSGopp lBM, /, 
Yes;(f3(BM), SIGpro, SIG0PP), Ill) , Yes;, Ill )) = 
[.CHALL x [b[c lMSGf0+1 I x [d-ISQ - PROP!
x ( (LMSGopp=M µ(MIBM, ,, No;(/3(BM), c., 1, Copp> M), w )
X (I.:;eN ; f N o;(/3(BM), c., 1, Copp, -1))1/J; d VOT;))) )d
x [e-IBM - PROP! 
x ( (LMSGopp=M µ(MIBM, ,, Yes;(f3(BM), c., 1 ,  Copp, M), w )
x (L;eN ; f Yes;(f3(BM), c., 1, copp, -1) )1/J;d VOT;))
Cnocomp* - ((Ccomp - Cnocomp) X [MSGopp ] )]e] c 
+ [,[..
IMSGro-ll x [h- ISQ - PROP!
X ( (LMSGopp=M µ(MIBM, /, No;(/3(BM), c., 1, Copp> M), W) 
x (I.:;eN ; f  No;(/3(BM), c., l , c0pp, -l ))1/J;d VOT;))]h
x [;- IBM - PROP! 
X ((LMSGopp=M µ(MIBM, /, Yes;(/3(BM), c., 1, Copp, M), W) 
X (LiEN i f  Y es;(/3(BM), c., 1, Copp> -1))1/J;d VOT;)) );]9 
Cnocomp* - ((ccomp - Cnocomp) X IMSGopp l )]e]c 
+ [(1 - CHALL) x - !PROP - SQI] 
A.3 Equilibrium Concept. 
An equilibrium for this model is defined as a set of pure strategies and beliefs such 
that each player maximizes their own interim expected utility. We assume, like Kreps 
and Wilson 1982 that all players have consistent beliefs. In addition, we assume that 
information recipients use Bayes' Rule to update their beliefs about the location of BM. 
We also assume voters always vote as if they are the pivotal voter (i.e., they adopt 
strategies that-are -weakly dominant with -respec4; to the-<itrategieN�f-0ther -voters. ) Let 
A(SIGpro, SIGopp) be the set of all points on [O, 1] that are possible locations of BM given
that signals SIGpro and SIGopp have been sent. We state the equilibrium concept for our 
model as a set of strategies (pro, opp, vot; )  and beliefs,such that for all (SIGpro, SIGopp) · 
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Proponent: 
v p RO P, pro( A, Ccomp , Cnocomp) satisfies: maXproE{0,1} x [0,1] x {-1,1}
<I>p(prolP ROP, Ccomp, Cnocomp, µopp(M SGopp lBM, ,, y es;((3(BM), SIGpro, SIGopp), IJi)
Opponent: 
VOP P, opp( SQ, Copp, BM) satisfies: maXoppE{-1,0,1} 
<I>0( opplSQ, SIG opp, (3(BMISIGpro, SIG0pp) ,  Y es;((3(BM), SIG pro, SIG0vv) ,  IJi)
voter i: 
VVOT; , vot;(VOT;, Ccomp, Cnocomp, MSGpro, Copp, MSGopp) satisfies maXvot; E{0,1}
<I>p(pri l( vot;IVOT;, (3(BMISIGpro, SIG0pp, Y es;((3(BM), SIGvro, SIG0pp) ,  IJi))
Beliefs: 
V(SIGpro, SIGopp) ,  
(3'(BMISIGpro, SIGopp) = { pr(SI�:��fGopp) if x E _A(SIGpro, SIG opp)0 otherwise 
where pr(SIGpro, SIGopp) = fA(SIGoro,SIG--\ df3' (BM).
A.3.1 Costly Action and Voter Inferences. 
Because the proponent and/or opponent need not contest the election the fact that they 
pay to do so can convey information to the voters. The information provided to voters 
by this action is that the spender believes that she can recover (at least) her costs. 
Let f(c.) ,  henceforth referred to as f, be a distance on the policy continuum which is an
increasing function of c • .  f determines the range of alternatives within which it will never
be profitable for the spender to wage a campaign an election. Since c. and the shape of the
proponent and opponent utility functions are known, so is the correspondence between 
c. and E. Lemma 1 shows that for BM within the "range of unprofitable alternatives"
[SQ - f, SQ + f] , there exist no costly strategies which provide the proponent with a
higher level of utility than costlessly accepting SQ. 
Lemma 1 If either the proponent 's ideal point or BM are located within the proponent's 
range of unprofitable alternatives, it is a dominated strategy to contest the election and/or 
wage a campaign. 
Proof: 
Consider the most favorable case for the proponent, where he is certain that the 
electorate will choose BM: 
I: j Yes;((3(BM), c., -l, c0pp, -l))¢;dVOT; = 1. 
iEN i 
Without loss of generality we examine the case where the proponent is certain that the 
election will be contested. The proponent's interim expected utility from CH ALL = 1 
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simplifies to - IBM - P ROPI - Coomp· Recall that the expected interim utility from
CHALL = 0 is -ISQ - P  ROPI.  From the definition of l, it follows that for any point in
[SQ - l, SQ + l], - ISQ - P ROPI > -IBM - P ROPI - c •. Even in the most favorable
case for the proponent, CHALL = 1 is a dominated strategy QED.
When c. > 0, and the proponent contests the election, voters know that BM </:
[SQ - l, SQ + l] and the voters' updated beliefs will have no support on this range.
When the proponent enters, voters use Bayes Rule to incorporate this information 
into their beliefs about the location of BM. A voter's (posterior) beliefs after observing
costly proponent effort are related to her prior beliefs, f3(BM) in the following manner:
I When voters know that c. has been paid:
0 
f3' (BM) x 1 /)rso+,�+"'so <l 
E [SQ - E, SQ + l] 
E [O, SQ - l), (SQ + l, I]. 
A similar relationship holds for voter observation of the opponent's expenditure. To 
see this relationship replace l with lopp in the preceding discussion. For the opponent, lopp 
is a function of Copp and the shape of the opponent's utility function. For the proponent, 
l is determined by the shape of her utility function and her beliefs about whether or not 
the election will be contested: 
Epro = J([(µ(l l*) + µ(-1 1*)) X Coomp] + [(µ(O I*) X Cnooomp] )•
A.3.2 Credibility and Voter Inference. 
In a one-shot interaction, where the cost of sending truthful messages equals the cost of 
sending untruthful messages, there exists no sanction for campaigners who send untruth­
ful messages. Therefore, the content of a minimally credible message is "cheap talk" and 
is thus uninformative to voters. That voters do not condition their beliefs on the content 
of minimally credible messages strikes us as obvious. For a more general discussion of 
credibility in the direct legislation context, see Lupia 1993. 
We now consider the case where the campaigner, either the proponent or the op­
ponent, is perfectly credible. In addition to updating their beliefs about the position 
of the alternative when they observe a costly alternative, voters who receive perfectly 
credible messages can further update their prior beliefs according to the content of the 
messages. Voters can infer that BM is not to the right of SQ when they receive the
perfectly credible message "BM is to the left of SQ." In general, this type of message
is not sufficient for voters to infer the exact location of BM. Voters use Bayes Rule to
incorporate this perfectly credible information into their prior beliefs about the location 
of BM. The density of a voter's "updated" beliefs are related to the her prior beliefs, (3
in the following manner: 
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If "left" is perfectly credible 
(3' (BM) x � E [O, SQ)
0 E (SQ, 1] 
If "right" is perfectly credible 
0 E [O, SQ) 
(3' (BM) x 1_/l)sui E (SQ, 1]
When both of the campaigners are minimally credible, voters condition their beliefs 
about the location of BM on their observation of the campaigners' costs only. In this 
case, the boundaries of the "range of unprofitable alternatives" are determined by the 
larger of E and Eopp· 
A.3.3 The Proponent's Equilibrium Strategy. 
Lemma 2 CH ALL = 1 if and only if 3 BM E (0, 1] such that the expected return to 
proposing is greater than the expected cost of proposing. 
The proof is obvious and follows from the assumption of interim utility maximization. 
Corollary 1 If CHALL = 1 , BM and PROP cannot be on different sides of SQ.
The proof is trivial. If BM is on the opposite side of SQ than PROP, then SQ offers 
strictly greater utility to the proponent, in which case CH ALL = 1 is a dominated 
strategy. This also implies that for all values of (0, 1] that the proponent could profitably 
choose as BM, he should either choose the same value of M SGpro or the value of M SGpro 
must be inconsequential in determining the outcome. 
It follows from the previous lemmas that BM must be a point on [O, 1] that is not 
in [SQ - E, SQ + E] and is on the same side of SQ as PROP. Let MSGpro = m be
the message that the proponent would choose for all of the values of BM that meet the 
requirements just stated. (If she is perfectly credible, M SGpro will have only one value 
for this set of BM by definition. If she is not perfectly credible, the content of MSGpro 
does not affect the outcome. 
It follows from interim utility maximization that Vbm, bm' E (0, 1] that BM = bm if
and only if: 
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[e- lbm - PROPI 
x ( (µ( -1 lbm, ')', Y es;(/3( bm ) ,  c., 1, Copp, -1), 1J!)
x (I:;eN ; J Yes;(f3(bm), c., 1 ,  Copp, -1))1/i;dVOT;) 
+ (µ(O lbm, ')', Y es;(/3(bm ) ,  c., 1) ,  if!)
x (I:;eN ; J Y es;(f3(bm),  c., 1 )1/i;dVOT;) 
+ (µ(l l bm, ')', Yes;(f3(bm), c., l , copp, 1 ) ,  if!)
X (I:;eN ; J Y es;(f3(bm ) ,  c., 1 ,  Copp, 1 ))1/i;dVOT;)) 
Cnocomp• - ((ccomp - Cnocomp) X IMSGopp l )]e 
[.- lbm' - PROPI 
X ( (µ(-1 lbm', ')', Y es;(/3( bm'), c., 1 ,  Copp, -1 ) ,  if!)
X (I:;eN ; J Y es;(/3(bm') ,  c. , 1 ,  Copp, -1 ))1/i;dVOT;) 
+ (µ(O lbm',  ')', Y es;(/3(bm'), c., 1 ) ,  if!) 
x (I:ieN ; J Yes;(f3(bm') , c. , 1)1/i;dVOT;)
+ (µ(1 lbm',  ')', Y es;(/3( bm'), c., 1 ,  Copp, 1 ) ,  if!)
X (I:;eN ; f Y es;(/3( bm') ,  c., 1 ,  Copp, 1)  )1/i;dV OT;))  
Cnocomp• - ( (ccomp - Cnocomp) X IMSGopp l)]e > 0 
The two primary components of this equation are ( 1 )  the spatial proximity between
bm and A and (2) the proponent's beliefs about how her choice of bm will affect the
opponent's and the electorate's actions. 
Lemma 3 If CHALL = 1 , BM # PROP if and only if 3bm =i PROP E [0, 1] such 
that the lower utility from setting bm # PROP is offset by the higher probability that bm 
is the outcome. 
Corollary 2 If CH ALL = 1 , BM = A if and only if j3bm # A E [O, l] such that the 
lower utility from setting BM # A is offset by the higher probability that BM is the 
outcome. 
Proof of Lemma: ( ---t)
If CHALL = 1 and MSGpro = 1, then since -IBM - PROPI > - lbm - PROPI >
- ISQ - P ROPI, for bm # A =  maxq,A(* I*) to be true, it must be true that:
(µ(- l lbm, c. , 1 ,  PENA, v(SQ l (bm?), 1,  -l))v(SQl (bm?), 1 ,  -1 )  
+ µ(Ole. ,  1 ,  PENA, v(SQl(bm?), 1, O))v(SQ l (bm?),  1 ,  0) 
+ µ(l l bm, c., 1 ,  PENA, v(SQl(bm?), 1 ,  l ))v(SQ l (bm?), 1 ,  1))  <
(µ(- I IA, c., 1 ,  PENA, v(SQl (A?) ,  1 ,  -l) )v(SQl (A?), 1 ,  -1)  
+ µ(Ole. ,  1 ,  PENA, v(SQl(A?), 1 ,  O))v(SQ l (A?) , 1 ,  0) 
+ µ(l lA, c., 1 ,  PENA, v(SQl(A?), 1 ,  l ))v(SQl (A?) , 1 ,  1))  
That is, the proponent expects that the probability that SQ is  the outcome is lower
if BM = bm than it is when BM = A. Recall that when SQ is the outcome, proposing
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causes the proponent to have ex post regret. This implies that the proponent is willing
to trade bm the lower utility from setting BM =/' A in exchange for a higher probability 
that BM is the outcome: 
[(µ(-1 lbm, /, N o;((J(bm ) ,  c., 1 ,  Copp, -1 ) ,  Ill) 
X (LiEN ; J N  o;((J(bm ), c., 1, Copp, -1 ))i/J;dVOT;)  
X (µ(-l lbm, /, N o;((J(bm ) ,  c., 1 ,  Copp, 0), Ill) 
X (LieN ; f N o; ((J(bm ), c., 1, Copp, 0))1/J;dVOT;)
x (µ( -1  lbm, /, N o;((J( bm ) ,  c., 1 ,  Copp, 1 ) ,  Ill)
X (LiEN ; J N  o; ((J(bm ), c., 1, Copp, 1 ) )1/J;dVOT;)]
[(µ(-1 /bm', /, N o;(fJ(bm ), c., 1, Copp, -1 ), Ill)
X (LiEN ; J N  o; ((J(bm ), c., 1, Copp, -1 ))i/J;dVOT;)  
x (µ(-1 /bm', /, N o;((J(bm ) ,  c., 1 ,  Copp' 0), Ill) 
X (LiEN ; J N  o;((J(bm ), c., 1, Copp, 0))1/J;dVOT;)
X (µ(-l /bm', 1, No;((J(bm), c., l , copp, l) ,  Ill ) 
x (L;eN i f  No; ((J(bm), c., l , copp, l))i/J;dVOT;)] > 
/PROP - bml 
(�) 
Follows straightforwardly from previous argument. QED. 
It follows from the previous lemma that BM = bm =/' PROP when the proponent 
believes that the opponent will wage a campaign that will affect the electoral outcome 
and -/bm - SQ/ - Copp > - IPROP - SQ/.  
Corollary 3 If CHALL = 1, BM = A if and only if /Jbm =/' A  E [0, 1] such that the 
lower utility from setting BM =/' A is offset by the higher probability that BM is the 
outcome. 
A.4 When will the campaign be competitive? 
Only when the opponent believes that she is credible enough or can exert observable 
costly effort sufficient to affect the electoral outcome, will she find it profitable to pay 
the costs of waging a campaign. 
Lemma 4 If the probability that the opponent can affect the outcome is positive, she 
wages a campaign when the difference in expected utility from' the two alternatives is 
larger than the cost of participation divided by the likelihood that the campaign will affect 
the outcome. 
Proof: 
The opponent participates when: 
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LiEN ; J Yes;(fJ(bm) ,  SIGpro' Copp> of 0)) 1/J;dVOT;)  X IBM - SQI)
( IMSGopp X C0pp) > 
LiEN ; J Y es;(/3(bm) ,  SIG pro, 0)) 1/J;dVOT;) X IBM - SQI
Which simplifies to: 
+ - IBM - SQI > 
Co 
Notice that the denominator of the right hand side of the inequality ranges between 
-1 and 1 . When the difference between the probabilities is 1 - the outcome is certain 
to be BM if MSGopp of 0 and is certain to be SQ if MSGopp = 0, then the right hand 
side of the inequality equals Copp, and for participation to be profitable in this extreme 
case the expected utility from BM must be at least Copp greater than the utility from 
SQ. When the difference between the probabilities is -1 - the outcome is certain to be 
BM if MSGopp of 0 and is certain to be SQ if MSGopp = 0, then for participation to be 
profitable in this extreme case the utility from SQ must be at least Copp greater than the 
expected utility from BM. When the difference between the probabilities approaches 
zero from either side - the outcome is likely to be unaffected by the opponent's decision, 
then the right hand side of the inequality approaches infinity, and it becomes less likely 
that any the opponent's type would find it profitable to participate. QED. 
In the context of our non-repeated game, neither the proposer nor the opponent will 
find it profitable to wage a campaign if they do not think that such behavior will pro­
duce their preferred electoral outcome. This implies that a competitive direct legislation 
campaign can only take place when both the opponent and the proposer are uncertain 
about voter preferences and are not too risk averse. 
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Proposer Opponent Voter i 
The extensive form yes yes yes 
Shape of all utility functions yes yes yes 
Proposer's ideal point yes no no 
Opponent's ideal point yes yes yes 
Voter i's ideal point no no yes 
Other voters' ideal points (not i) no no no 
Status Quo content yes yes yes 
Ballot Measure content yes1 yes no 
Magnitude of proposer's costs yes2 yes yes 
Magnitude of opponent's costs no yes yes 
Proponent campaign message content yes' yes yes 
Opponent campaign message content no yes1 yes 
1 Chosen by that player. 
2 Knows it for non-competitive and competitive cases, does not know the level of competition. 
Table 1: What each player knows when they choose their strategies 
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